DISCOVERY OF PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
COMMUNICATIONS AFTER TARASOFF

In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California the
California Supreme Court created a bifurcated cause of action. Under the "should have" branch of the Tarasoff holding

a peculiarset of discovery problems arise.This Comment discusses several currently available proceduraldevices which

may help resolve these problems. It points out the need for a
more refined and discriminatingprocess for handling discovery of putatively privileged therapist-patientcommunications. Finally, it suggests a procedure, based on existing
Californiastatutory and case law, which will effectuate the
Tarasoff cause of actionwhile protecting legitimateinterests
of therapist-patientconfidentiality.

INTRODUCTION

In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California' the California Supreme Court created a duty and a cause of action previously
unrecognized in California. 2 The court ruled that
[wihen a therapist3 determines, or pursuant to the standards of his
profession should determine, that his patient 4 presents a serious dan1. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
2. Id. at 433-39, 551 P.2d at 342-46, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21-26. See also Annot., 10
A.L.R.3d 619 (1966).
3. The court treats the term therapist as synonymous with the word
psychotherapist;therefore, this Comment will use these terms interchangeably.
The use of these words in the context of the Tarasoff opinion is impliedly
limited to psychiatrists and psychologists. 17 Cal. 3d at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131
Cal. Rptr. at 25. But see CAL. EVD. CODE § 1010(c)-(e) (West Supp. 1977), (also
includes as psychotherapists for the purpose of privileged communications
licensed clinical social workers, school psychologists, and marriage, family, and
child counselors); 49 Op. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 104 (1967) (concludes that the use of the
term psychotherapist by marriage, family, and child counselors is not proscribed by statute).
4. CAL. EVD. CODE § 1011 (West 1966) defines patient as
a person who consults a psychotherapist or submits to an examination
by a psychotherapist for the purpose of securing a diagnosis or preven-
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ger of violence to another, 5 he incurs an obligation to use reasonable
care to protect the intended victim against such danger. The discharge
of this duty. . . may call for [the therapist] to warn the intended victim
other steps are reasonably necessary under
. . . or to take whatever
8
the circumstances.

Vigorous dissent accompanied the majority opinion 7 and profuse
academic comment followed. 8
tive, palliative, or curative treatment of his mental or emotional condition or who submits to an examination of his mental or emotional condition for the purpose of scientific research on mental or emotional problems.
5. The threatened person must be the foreseeable victim of danger. The
court refused to hold that the warning must be given only when the therapist
actually knows the identity of the threatened victim, 17 Cal. 3d at 439 n.11, 551
P.2d at 345 n.11, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 n.11, but spoke in terms of persons "readily
identifiable" by the therapist. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21. In
delineating this duty within a duty to identify the threatened person, the court
established vague maximum and minimum standards regarding the extent to
which a therapist must inquire into a threatened victim's identity, but it avoided
any "hard and fast rule." Although recognizing that "in some cases it would be
unreasonable to require the therapist to interrogate his patient to discover the
victim's identity or to conduct an independent investigation," the court also
noted other cases where "a moment's reflection will reveal the victim's identity."
In what cases it would not be unreasonable to require an interrogation or
investigation and how long a "moment's .reflection" is, are questions the answers to which will depend on the circumstances of each case. Id. at 439 n.11, 551
P.2d at 435 n.11, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 n.11 (emphasis added).
6. Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
7. Justice Mosk concurred and dissented; Justice Clark, with whom Justice
McComb concurred, dissented.

8. Ayres & Holbrook, Law, Psychotherapy,and the Duty to Warn:A Tragic

Trilogy?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 677 (1975); Schindler, Malpractice-AnotherDimension of Liability-A Critical Analysis, 20 TRIAL LAw. GUIDE 129 (1976);

Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions:Suing Psychotherapiststo SafeguardSociety,
90 HARv. L. REV. 358 (1976); Comment, Psychotherapist-PatientPrivilege-

Patient'sDangerous Condition-Confidentiality-LegalDuty to Warn Potential Victim, 9 AKRON L. REV. 191 (1976); Comment, Psychiatry-Torts-A
PsychotherapistWho Knows Or Should Know His PatientIntends Violence to
AnotherIncurs a Duty to Warn, 7 CUM. L. REv. 551 (1977); Comment, Tarasoffv.
Regents of the University of California:Psychotherapists,Policemen, and the
Duty to Warn-An UnreasonableExtension of the Common Law?, 6 GOLDEN
GATE L. REV. 229 (1975); Comment, Cause of Action Can Be Stated Against
Psychotherapist Employed by University Hospital, and Against Campus
Policefor Breach of Duty to Warn Victim of PerilfromPatientas Disclosed by
Patient'sCommunications, 12 Hous. L. REV. 986 (1975); Note, The Dangerous
PsychiatricPatient-TheDoctor'sDuty to Warn, 10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 593

Has
(1975); Comment, Physiciansand Surgeons-Negligence-Psychotherapist
a Duty to Warn an Endangered Victim Whose Peril Was Disclosed to
Psychotherapistby Patient,53 N.D.L. REV. 279 (1976); Comment, Tarasoff and
the Psychotherapist'sDuty to Warn, 12 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 932 (1975); Note,

Duty Imposed on Psychotherapiststo Exercise Reasonable Care to Warn Potential Victims of ForeseeableImminent DangerPosed by Mentally Ill Patients, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 536 (1975); Comment, The Dangerous Patient
Exception and the Duty to Warn: Creation of a Dangerous Precedent, 9
U.C.D.L. REV. 549 (1976); Comment, ConfidentialCommunications-Privileged
Communications-Psychiatry-PsychotherapistHas a Duty to Warn an
Endangered Victim Whose Peril Was Disclosed by CommunicationsBetween
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One practical inquiry that must be made regarding Tarasoffis the
following: Assume that a person is battered and seriously injured by
another who is later discovered to be, or to have been, 9 a patient in
psychotherapy. Possible defendants are the assailant, and in California after Tarasoff, the assailant's psychotherapist. 10 If the plaintiff
alleges in a suit against the therapist that the latter should have
determined that his patient was dangerous, how will the plaintiff
prove his case? Any attempt to discover probative information in
defendant-therapist's control will be met by a refusal to permit
the Psychotherapistand His Patient,44 U. CiN. L. REV. 368 (1975); Note, Imposing a Duty to Warn on Psychiatrists-A Judicial Threat to the Psychiatric
Profession, 48 U. CoLo. L. REV. 283 (1977); Note, Psychiatrist'sDuty to the
Public:ProtectionFrom DangerousPatients,1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1103; Comment,
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California: The Psychotherapist's
Peril, 37 U. PITT. L. REV. 155 (1976); Comment, Risk Allocation in Mental
Health Care: Whether to Treat the Patient or His Victim, 1975 UTAH L. REV.
553; Comment, Liability of Psychotherapistfor Failureto Warn of Homicide
by Patient, 28 VAND. L. REV. 631 (1975); Comment, Tort Law: California's
Expansion of the Duty to Warn, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 496 (1976).
9. The assailant need not still be a patient at the time of the attack on the
plaintiff. The length of time between an alleged negligent failure to ascertain
dangerousness and a subsequent injury will bear on the issues of foreseeability
and proximate cause. Two months elapsed between Prosenjit Poddar's threat
against Ms. Tarasoff and the killing. Poddar did not attend therapy during this
time. The court did not address this point. For the facts of the Tarasoff case see
People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d 750, 518 P.2d 342, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1974).
10. It has been asserted that "circumstances under which the 'duty to warn'
might arise [will] be extremely rare." Ayres & Holbrook, Law, Psychotherapy,
and the Duty to Warn: A Tragic Trilogy?, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 677, 703 (1975).
This prediction may be true. It is certain, however, that circumstances in which
it is alleged that a duty to warn had arisen will be less rare and will be, perhaps,
quite frequent. Every time a person is assailed by another who is, or was, a
patient in psychotherapy, the essential ingredients exist for a malpractice suit
under Tarasoff.Actually, the plaintiff need know only the fact of his assailant's
psychotherapy and the name of the therapist in order to file his complaint. It is
conceivable, however, under California's "John Doe" procedure, that the plaintiff in a civil action against an assailant could join a John Doe defendanttherapist without any certainty that the assailant was ever a patient in
psychotherapy. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 474 (West Supp. 1977). See generally
Comment, Suing PartiesDefendant by FicticiousNames, 22 CALIF. L. REV. 685
(1934); Note, Designationof Defendants by FicticiousNames-Use of the John
Doe Complaint, 46 IOWA L. REV. 773 (1961).
The actual merit of the plaintiff's claim and his likelihood of prevailing at trial
will not be critical factors in his determination to initiate malpractice litigation
against his assailant's therapist. Indeed, in light of the informational and discovery difficulties of the Tarasoff plaintiff's position, in many cases the plaintiff will be unaware of the actual merit of his claim. More likely, the factors
bearing on the plaintiff's decision to sue the therapist will be the seriousness of
the injury sustained, the ability or inability to extract a satisfactory damage
award from a possibly indigent assailant, and the presence of an insured defendant-therapist.

discovery of privileged therapist-patient communications.11 Tarasoff
is inapposite as precedent because there defendant-therapists had in
fact predicted violence by the patient. The Tarasoff court ruled that
the dangerous-patient exception obviated the therapist-patient
privilege. 12 In cases brought under the "should have" tenet of the
Tarasoff holding, however, the applicability of the dangerous-pa3
tient exception is at issue during pre-trial discovery.'
THE PROBLEm

Discovery difficulties will arise in some cases brought under the
new Tarasoff cause of action for two reasons. First, the Tarasoff
holding is broader than the facts of the case. Second, the court draws
a misleading analogy between Tarasoff-type situations and medical
malpractice cases.
The Scope of the Tarasoff Holding
Tarasoff holds that "once a therapist does in fact determine, or
under applicableprofessionalstandardsreasonablyshould have determined, that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to others,
he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable
victim of that danger.' 4 The scope of the duty is not restricted to
facts similar to those of the Tarasoff case. In Tarasoff the defendanttherapists actually determined that the patient was dangerous."5
However, the Tarasoff holding also includes situations in which a
therapist should have predicted dangerousness but did not.
The differences between these two situations are significant for a
plaintiff attempting to discover information in defendant-therapist's
control. In Tarasoff and other cases in which the defendant-therapist
actually predicts violence toward a foreseeable victim, the issue of
privileged communication does not arise. The dangerous-patient exception to the therapist-patient privilege provides that "[t]here is no
privilege. . . if the psychotherapist has reasonable cause to believe
."I' However, if the plaintiff
that his patient is . . . dangerous ..
11. The comment to the 1965 Evidence Code, CAL. EvID. CODE § 1014 comment
(3) (West 1966) (current version at CAL. EvD. CODE § 1014 (West Supp. 1977)),
states that the therapist-patient privilege is applicable to civil actions for damages arising from the patient's criminal conduct. The therapist is required to
claim the privilege. Id. § 1015.
12. 17 Cal. 3d at 440-42, 551 P.2d at 346-48, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 26-28. See general-

ly Comment, The Dangerous PatientException and the Duty to Warn: Creation of a DangerousPrecedent,9 U.C.D.L. REv. 549, 557 (1976).
13. See note 17 infra.
14. 17 Cal. 3d at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
16. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 (West 1966).
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alleges that his assailant's therapist should have determined that his
patient was dangerous but did not, the applicability of the dangerous-patient exception will be in dispute. The defendant-therapist
will certainly contend that he did not have reasonable cause to
believe his patient dangerous and therefore the exception does not
apply. To admit the applicability of the dangerous-patient exception
would be tantamount to admitting the essential elements of the
17
plaintiff's cause of action.
In situations where the defendant-therapist denies the applicability of the dangerous-patient exception and objects to the plaintiff's
attempt to discover therapist-patient communications," Tarasoff is
of little value as precedent. An actual determination of dangerousness was made in Tarasoff. Neither the facts of Tarasoff nor the
majority opinion provide a guide for resolving the disputed privilege
issue in cases in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendanttherapist should have predicted violence. 9
17. The dangerous-patient exception will apply if defendant-therapist had
reasonable cause to believe his patient dangerous and if disclosure was necessary to prevent threatened danger. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1024 (West 1966). To state a
Tarasoff cause of action, the plaintiff must show 1) that defendant-therapist
did, or under applicable professional standards should have determined that his
patient posed a serious danger of violence; 2) that plaintiff was the foreseeable
victim of that violence; 3) that therefore defendant-therapist had a duty of
reasonable care to protect plaintiff; 4) that defendant-therapist's conduct fell
below the standard of reasonable care; and 5) that defendant-therapist's failure
to exercise reasonable care proximately resulted in plaintiff's injury. 17 Cal. 3d
at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
The parallel between the dangerous-patient exception and the first two elements of the Tarasoff cause of action is apparent. For the defendant-therapist
to admit the applicability of the exception would be to admit the essential
elements of plaintiff's cause of action.
The problem addressed here may also arise when the plaintiff alleges that the
defendant-therapist did in fact predict dangerousness, although the procedural
difficulties are not as complex as when the plaintiff alleges that the defendanttherapist should have predicted dangerousness. In situations where there was
an actual prediction of dangerousness the defendant-therapist may still deny
the applicability of the dangerous-patient exception on the ground that the
plaintiff was not a foreseeable victim. The foreseeability issue will then have to
be decided at a proceeding like the one suggested in this Comment. If the
plaintiff alleges that the defendant-therapist should have predicted dangerousness, the far more complicated issue of whether defendant-therapist had reasonable cause to make such a prediction must also be decided. See notes 87-99
and accompanying text infra.
18. Privileged communications are not subject to discovery. Rudnick v.
Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 924, 929, 523 P.2d 643, 647, 114 Cal. Rptr. 603, 607
(1974); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2016, 2030, 2031, 2033 (West Supp. 1977).
19. See 17 Cal. 3d at 451, 551 P.2d at 353, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 33 (Mosk, J.,
dissenting).

Tarasoff and Medical Malpractice
It is easy to liken Tarasoff to a medical malpractice case. A
psychotherapist 0 is a medical doctor if he is a psychiatrist. A clinical
psychologist is viewed as a quasi-medical professional often referred
to as "doctor" by colleagues and patients. The Tarasoff court
analogized the psychotherapist to the regular physician:
The role of the psychiatrist, who is indeed a practitioner of
medicine, and that of a psychologist who performs an allied function,
are like that of the physician who must conform to the standards of
the profession and who must often make diagnoses and predictions
based upon such evaluations. Thus the judgment of the therapist in
diagnosing emotional disorders and in predicting whether a patient
presents a serious danger of violence is comparable to the judgment
must regularly render under acceptwhich doctors and professionals
21
ed rules of responsibility.

The court carried the psychotherapist-physician analogy further by
applying the usual comparative standard of medical negligence in
Tarasoff-type cases. The court held that in determining whether his
patient poses a serious danger of violence a therapist must exercise
"that reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily posmembers of that professional specialty under
sessed and exercised by'22
similar circumstances.

Ordinary medical malpractice cases and cases arising under the
Tarasoff cause of action differ, however, in one critical respect. A
medical malpractice suit against the physician is usually brought by
his patient.2" Malpractice action against the therapist under Tarasoff
will never be brought by the patient. 24 The importance of this difference lies not only in the respective plaintiffs' firsthand knowledge of
defendants' allegedly negligent conduct, but also in the plaintiffs'
ability to discover probative information in the defendants' control.
The plaintiff in the usual medical malpractice case has little difficulty evidencing the defendant-physician's conduct.25 He often has
20. Psychotherapistis defined in note 3 supra.
21. 17 Cal. 3d at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
22. Id.
23. But see, e.g., Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1970), in which a suit was brought by the plaintiff who contracted disease from a
patient of the defendant-physician as a result of the latter's negligent failure to
diagnose. This genre of suits by third parties would seem to constitute an
extremely small fraction of medical malpractice claims. See generally C. STETLER & A. MORITZ, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAw 363-75 (4th ed. 1962).
24. Although the Tarasoff duty perse seems to be limited to third persons, 17
Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20, it is conceivable that a patient
might kill his spouse or parent and sue the therapist under Tarasoff for wrongful death. See generally CAL.CIV. PROC.CODE § 337 (West Supp. 1977).
25. The patient-plaintiff's problem has traditionally been obtaining expert
testimony to establish customary practice for comparison with the defendantphysician's conduct. See Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. 2d 465,480, 234 P.2d 34,
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personal knowledge of relevant events. Furthermore, the defendantphysician is subject to the patient-plaintiff's discovery. Discovery is
not hampered by the privileged communication objection. The patient-plaintiff is the holder of the privilege26 and may waive it at any
time.27 Moreover, any obstacle to discovery is obviated by
the pa28
tient-plaintiff tendering his physical condition into issue.
The Tarasoff plaintiff, on the other hand, is outside the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. He will have no first hand knowledge of what transpired between the defendant-therapist and the
patient-assailant during therapy. His discovery will not reach
privileged communication. 29 As a defendant, the therapist may not

assert the psychotherapist-patient privilege in his own behalf.3"
However, the therapist has an affirmative obligation to protect the
patient's privacy by resisting the non-patient plaintiff's attempt to
discover therapist-patient communications. 31 To the extent that the
defendant-therapist's interest in obstructing discovery coincides
with the patient's privacy interest, the Tarasoff plaintiff may be
frustrated in his attempt to acquire information in the defendant32
therapist's control which would tend to prove negligence.
THEORiES FOR OVERCOMING THE TARAsoFF
PLAINTIFF'S DISCOVERY DIFFICULTIES

A Tarasoff plaintiff might utilize several theories to overcome a
defendant-therapist's invocation of the therapist-patient privilege.
The privilege belongs to the patient, not to the therapist.33 The pur-

pose of the privilege is to avoid the humiliation of the patient that
44 (1951) (Carter, J., dissenting); Markus, Conspiracyof Silence, 14 CLEV.-MAR.
L. REV. 520 (1965).
26. CAL. EVID. CODE § 993 (West 1966).

27. Id. § 912.
28. Id. § 996.
29. See note 18 supra.
30. Cf. Roberts v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 330,341,508 P.2d 309,316,107 Cal.
Rptr. 309, 316 (1973) (therapist-patient privilege is that of the patient and not that
of the therapist).
31. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1015 (West 1966).
32. The provisions of the California Evidence Code relating to privileges are
applicable in all proceedings in which testimony can be compelled. Id. §§ 901,
910. Any information that would be privileged at trial is also privileged for the
purpose of discovery. Crest Catering Co. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. 2d 274,277,
398 P.2d 150, 152, 42 Cal. Rptr. 110, 112 (1965).
33. Roberts v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 330, 341, 508 P.2d 309, 316, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 309, 316 (1973).

might accompany disclosure of his illness. 34 Thus, a therapist may
not assert the privilege if it has been waived by the patient or if the
communication falls within one of the statutory exceptions.3 5 In
addition to waiver under California Evidence Code section 912, three
exceptions are apposite here: section 1016 (the patient-litigant exception), section 1020 (the breach of duty exception), and section
1024 (the dangerous-patient exception).
Section 912: Waiver
California Evidence Code section 91236 provides for waiver of the
therapist-patient privilege if the holder 37 voluntarily discloses a significant part of the privileged communication. The patient, plaintiff's assailant, may cooperate with the plaintiff in a suit against the
therapist, but that is a dubious assumption. 38 If the patient is unwilling to assist the plaintiff but nevertheless discloses a significant part
of the therapist-patient communication, the privilege is waived. 39
However, the admission by the patient of the mere fact or purpose of
his psychotherapy is insufficient to constitute waiver. 40 Disclosure of
a significant part of the substance of the privileged communication is
required under section 912.41
The privilege is also waived under section 912 if the patient consents to a third party's disclosure.42 Consent may be "manifested by
any statement or other conduct of the holder . .. including his

failure to claim the privilege in any proceeding in which he has the
34. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 434, 467 P.2d 557, 569, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 841
(1970).
35. Id. at 430, 467 P.2d at 566, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 838.
36. [T]he right of any person to claim a privilege provided by... Section
1014 (psychotherapist-patient privilege) ... is waived with respect to a
communication protected by such privilege if any holder of the
privilege, without coercion, has disclosed a significant part of the communication or has consented to such disclosure made by anyone.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 912 (West 1966).
37. The holder of the therapist-patient privilege is the patient, his guardian or
conservator, or his personal representative if the patient is dead. Id. § 1013.
38. The presumably negative feelings harbored by the patient-assailant toward the plaintiff may be offset by countervailing negative feelings toward the
therapist due to the psychoanalytic phenomenon of transference. See Comment, The Liabilityof PsychiatristsforMalpractice,36 U. PrTT.L. REV. 108, 122
(1974). Also, the assailant may waive the privilege as part of a settlement with
the plaintiff. If a guardian, conservator, or personal representative has become
the holder of the privilege, the obstacle of the patient-assailant's hostility toward
the plaintiff may be diminished.
39. CAL. EviD. CODE § 912 (West 1966).
40. Roberts v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 330, 340, 508 P.2d 309, 315, 107 Cal.
Rptr. 309, 315 (1973).
41. People v. Perry, 7 Cal. 3d 756, 783,499 P.2d 129, 146, 103 Cal. Rptr. 161,178
(1972). Disclosure that a particular matter was not discussed during
psychotherapy will not constitute waiver. Id.
42. CAL. EVD. CODE § 912 (West 1966).
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legal standing and opportunity to claim the privilege." 43 Plaintiff's
discovery is such a proceeding. 44 Thus, a patient's knowledgeable
failure to claim the privilege during the plaintiff's discovery directed
at the patient might be considered waiver for the purpose of the
plaintiff's subsequent discovery directed at the therapist.45 The
California Supreme Court has suggested that if the holder of a
privilege remains silent when warned that disclosure of a privileged
communication will be sought from another source, a waiver is effected.46 This seems overbroad. The statutory language speaks of
consent manifested by conduct. If no reason exists to infer that the
holder's silence indicates consent, there would seem to be no ground
for waiver. The courts have held that "it must clearly appear there is
an intention to waive, and a court will not run to such a conclu47
sion.1
In summary, waiver under section 912 is available to the Tarasoff
plaintiff to force discovery of communications claimed privileged by
a defendant-therapist. Its applicability, however, is inconstant and
uncertain. The plaintiff's access to probative information in the defendant-therapist's control depends entirely on the plaintiff's assailant. Cooperative waiver, waiver by disclosure of a significant part of
the communication, and waiver by failure to assert the privilege
require the voluntary or unwitting cooperation of the patient.
Section 1016: The Patient-LitigantException
A Tarasoff plaintiff might attempt to discover information in defendant-therapist's control by invoking the patient-litigant exception 48 to the psychotherapist-patient privilege. If the patient-assailant tenders his mental or emotional condition into issue in an action
to which he is a party, he waives any privilege regarding relevant
communications. In In re Lifschutz, 49 the California Supreme Court
construed this exception "not as a complete waiver ... but only as a
43. Id.
44. Id. § 901.

45. But see People v. Kor, 129 Cal. App. 2d 436,443-44, 277 P.2d 94, 99 (1954).
46. People v. Perry, 7 Cal. 3d 756,783, 499 P.2d 129, 146, 103 Cal. Rptr. 161, 178

(1972) (dictum).
47. Torbensen v. Family Life Ins. Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 401,404, 329 P.2d 596,
597-98 (1958); Newell v. Newell, 146 Cal. App. 2d 166,178,303 P.2d 839,847 (1956).

Accord, Elliot v. Watkins Trucking Co., 406 F.2d 90, 93-94 (1969).
48. "There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant to
an issue concerning the mental or emotional condition of the patient if such
issue has been tendered by the patient." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1016 (West 1966).
49. 2 Cal. 3d 415, 467 P.2d 557, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829 (1970).

limited waiver concomitant with the purposes of the exception."50
The Lifschutz court expressly identified two purposes for the exception:
First, the courts have noted that the patient, in raising the issue of a
specific ailment or condition in litigation, in effect dispenses with the
confidentiality of that ailment and may no longer justifiably seek
protection from the humiliation of its exposure. Second, the exception
represents a judgment that, in all fairness, a patient should not be
while simultaneously foreclosing inpermitted to establish a claim
1
quiry into relevant matters.5

A third purpose was also suggested by the court: "In order to facilitate the ascertainment of truth and the just resolution of legal claims,
the state clearly exerts a justifiable interest in requiring [disclosure
of] communications, confidential or otherwise, relevant to pending
litigation."5 2
The patient-litigant exception will not be available to the Tarasoff
plaintiff in all situations. If the plaintiff never sues the patientassailant or sues the therapist first, the exception will be unavailable
in the action against the therapist.53 However, additional possibilities exist: the plaintiff may join the patient and the therapist as
defendants in a single suit, or the patient then the therapist may be
sued separately. 54 These latter situations will be examined in light of
the limitations placed on the patient-litigant exception by Lifschutz.
If the patient raises an issue concerning his mental condition 5 in a
civil action in which he and the therapist are joined as defendants,
the patient-litigant exception will probably be available for the
plaintiff's use against the therapist. Such use of the exception seems
50. Id. at 435, 467 P.2d at 570, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
51. Id. at 433, 467 P.2d at 569, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
52. Id. at 425, 467 P.2d at 563, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
53. In order to avoid a similar problem with former testimony in the physician-patient context, an exception was provided barring privilege in any action
to recover damages for the criminal conduct of a patient. CAL. EVID. CODE § 999
(West Supp. 1977). The comment to § 999 before its 1975 amendment stated: "The
admissibility of evidence should not depend on the order in which civil and
criminal matters are tried. This exception is provided, therefore, so that the
same evidence is admissible in the civil case without regard to when the criminal
case is tried." Id. comment (West 1966).
The therapist-patient privilege has no comparable exception. The comment to
the 1975 amendment to § 999 notes that "the exception provided by section 999,
like other exceptions in this article, does not apply to the therapist-patient
privilege. ... [T]he exceptions to that privilege are much more narrowly
drawn." Id. (West Supp. 1977).
54. The plaintiff might sue the patient then the therapist separately. More
likely, where the plaintiff has sustained any substantial injury, a criminal action
will result against the patient-assailant. The criminal case will almost certainly
reach the courts before plaintiff's civil suit. E.g., People v. Poddar, 10 Cal. 3d
750, 518 P.2d 342, 111 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1974).
55. See generally Carlton v. Superior Court, 261 Cal. App. 2d 282, 289-90, 67
Cal. Rptr. 568, 573 (1968).
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"concomitant with the purposes of the exception."5 6 The patient
dispenses with the confidentiality by raising the issue. Furthermore,
the patient will not be permitted to claim a mental condition while
foreclosing inquiry into the relevant matter of his communications
with his therapist. Finally, the use of the exception in these cases is
"to facilitate 57
the ascertainment of truth and the just resolution of
legal claims.

If the plaintiff sues the patient and then sues the therapist separately, the availability of the patient-litigant exception is doubtful. If
the patient tenders an issue concerning his mental condition in the
prior action, the question is raised: Are privileges that fall in one
action pursuant to the patient-litigant exception considered to be
fallen in a subsequent action to which the patient is not a party? The
answer is not clear. Several courts have held that "once [a] privilege
is waived it is gone for good."5 8 If a patient calls his therapist as a
witness and elicits from him a significant part of the therapistpatient communication, the privilege is waived under section 912
even in a separate action against the patient on an unrelated matter.59 But if the patient merely tenders his mental condition into issue
and the privilege falls pursuant to the patient-litigant exception,
there is no reason to believe that the privilege will be eliminated for
the purpose of a subsequent suit not involving the holder of the
privilege."
Utilization of the patient-litigant exception by a Tarasoffplaintiff
in a separate action against the therapist is not "concomitant with
the purposes of the exception." 6' Such use is not to prevent the
patient from foreclosing inquiry into a claimed mental condition.
56. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 435, 467 P.2d 557, 570, 85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 842
(1970).
57. Id. at 425, 467 P.2d at 563, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
58. Markwell v. Sykes, 173 Cal. App. 2d 642, 648, 343 P.2d 769, 773 (1959).
Accord, Deacon v. Bryans, 212 Cal. 87, 93, 298 P.2d 30, 32-33 (1931). In both of

these cases the holder of the privilege was also a defendant in the subsequent
suit.

59. People v. Garaux, 34 Cal. App. 3d 611,613, 110 Cal. Rptr. 119,120 (1973). In

Garaux, the lawyer-client privilege was held to have been waived for the purpose of a subsequent suit where the client testified regarding the substance of

the lawyer-client communication in a prior suit. See also Stearns v. Los Angeles

School Dist., 244 Cal. App. 2d 696, 723, 53 Cal. Rptr. 482, 500 (1966); Agnew v.
Superior Court, 156 Cal. App. 2d 838, 840-41, 320 P.2d 158, 160 (1958). In both of

these cases the holder of the privilege was also a party to the subsequent suit.

60. See generally Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 1, 59 (1972).

61. In re Lifschutz, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 435, 467 P.2d 557,570,85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 842
(1970).

Although Lifschutz held that a patient dispenses with confidentiality
by raising the issue, it is by no means clear that the court considered
the dispensation to extend beyond the suit in which the issue was
raised. The Lifschutz court saw the exception as "compel[ling] disclosure only in cases in which the patient's own action initiates the
exposure . . ., [with] a patient's privacy remain[ing] essentially
under the patient's control.6 2 The "gone for good" approach to waiver
conflicts with the Lifschutz formulation of a limited inquiry. Unless
the court emphasizes the exception's general purpose of "ascertainment of truth and . . . just resolution of legal claims"6 3 it seems
unlikely that the exception will be extended beyond the action in
which it arises.
The patient-litigant exception may prove helpful to the Tarasoff
plaintiff. However, it suffers from the same defect as waiver under
section 912. The applicability of the patient-litigant exception in
both instances is initiated by the patient. The uncertainty of its
availability is compounded by its apparent inappropriateness in light
of Lifschutz. Both section 912 and section 1016 are potentially useful
to the Tarasoff plaintiff, but neither assures him access to the information essential to make his cause of action meaningful.
Section 1020: The Breach of Duty Exception
The breach of duty exception6 4 was designed to apply in disputes
between the therapist and the patient in which one charges the other
with a breach of duty.6 5 There are parallel exceptions to the physician-patient privilege (section 958) and the lawyer-client privilege
(section -100).66 The Law Revision Commission's comment to section
958 applies to the breach of duty exception to the therapist-patient
privilege as well as to the matching exceptions in the physician and
lawyer contexts. 67 The comment states that one purpose of the exception is to prevent the patient or client from accusing the professional
of a breach of duty and then invoking the privilege to obstruct the
professional's defense.6 8 The breach of duty exception therefore duplicates the patient-litigant exception to the therapist- and physician-patient privileges and in effect comprises a "client-litigant"
exception to the lawyer-client privilege.
62. Id. at 433, 467 P.2d at 568, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 840.
63. Id. at 425, 467 P.2d at 563, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 835.

64. "There is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant to
an issue of breach, by the psychotherapist or by the patient, of a duty arising out
of the psychotherapist-patient relationship." CAL. EVID. CODE § 1020 (West 1966).
65. See B. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK 661 (1972).

66. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1001, 958 (West 1966).
67. Id. §§ 1001 comment, 1020 comment.

68. Id. § 958.
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The Commission's comment states that another purpose of the
exception is to prevent the patient or client from refusing to pay the
69
professional's fee and then invoking the privilege to defeat a claim.
This objective seems to be the sole purpose of the exception in the
context of the therapist- and physician-patient privileges. In any
action by a patient against a therapist or physician for breach of
duty, the patient can waive the privilege under section 912. However,
70
the only duty generally owed by the patient is payment of the fee.
Thus, the only duty presently covered by the breach of duty exception to the therapist- and physician-patient privileges that is not also
covered by another exception is the patient's duty to pay the fee.
No case has been reported in which the breach of duty exception
has been utilized in the context of the therapist-patient privilege.
However, this unused exception appears on its face to be apropos to
the Tarasoff plaintiff's discovery purposes. Under section 1020
"[t]here is no privilege . . . as to a communication relevant to an
issue of breacA, by the psychotherapist. . . , of a duty arising out of
the psychotherapist-patient relationship."' 1 Clearly, the therapist's
new duty to third persons under Tarasoff arises out of the therapistpatient relationship. This duty is breached if the therapist negligently fails to determine that his patient poses a serious danger of violence. Ostensibly, if a Tarasoff plaintiff alleges such a breach of duty
and shows that communications sought are relevant to his allegation,
the privilege will fall under a literal reading of section 1020. Actually, it is certain that more should, and will be required.
It must be remembered that the confidentiality entailed in the
therapist-patient privilege is highly regarded despite a deterioration
of evidentiary privileges generally. 72 An assurance of confidentiality
has been acknowledged by the legislature and the courts as an essential element of successful psychotherapy.7 3 The protection afforded
the privilege has resulted in narrowly drawn and precisely construed
4
exceptions.7
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. Id. § 1020.
72. In re Lifschutz, 3 Cal. 3d 415, 434-35 n.20, 467 P.2d 557, 570 n.20, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 829, 842 n.20 (1970). See also Louisell, The Psychologistin Today's Legal
World: Part I, 41 MINN. L. REv. 731, 731-33 (1957).
73. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 440, 551 P.2d 334,
346, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 26 (1976).
74. See CAL. EvD. CODE § 999 comment (West Supp. 1977). See, e.g., id. § 1016
(West 1966).

The utilization of the breach of duty exception in the Tarasoff
framework would require an expansion of the purpose-if not the
terms-of the exception. The duty contemplated by section 1020
before Tarasoff was owed only within the bounds of the professional
relationship. 5 Under the statute as enacted, only the patient or the
therapist may invoke the exception to defeat the privilege. 76 But in
the Tarasoff context the issue is whether a third party has standing to
utilize the exception.
In enacting section 1020, the legislature clearly envisioned only a
duty owed by a therapist to a patient or by a patient to a therapist.
The Law Revision Commission's comment states that "[t]he duty
involved must, of course, be one arising out of the professional relationship. ' 77 The examples following this statement refer only to the
two parties directly involved. Before Tarasoff, neither the therapist
78
nor the patient owed any duty other than that owed to each other.
Thus, the narrow construction of exceptions to the therapist-patient
privilege would seem to preclude any expansion of the exception to
include third parties. Further, in keeping with the high protection
given to the therapist-patient privilege, it is unlikely that a mere
allegation of negligence by a third party will or should be sufficient
to penetrate therapist-patient confidentiality. For these reasons, the
breach of duty exception will probably be of no avail to the Tarasoff
plaintiff.
Section 1024: The Dangerous-PatientException
The dangerous-patient exception 79 was used in Tarasoff to overcome defendant-therapists' privilege objections. In Tarasoff the
therapists had in fact predicted violence toward a foreseeable victim.
Consequently, the applicability of the exception was clear.80 However, in cases arising under the "should have" tenet of the Tarasoff
holding, the applicability of the exception is uncertain.
One problem regarding section 1024 is the apparent prospective
and preventive nature of the exception vis-A-vis its retrospective
application for discovery purposes under Tarasoff. The Law Revision
75. See id. § 958 comment. See also B. JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE
661 (1972).
76. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 958 comment (West 1966).

BENCHBOOK

77. Id.
78. See note 23 supra.
79. There is no privilege under this article if the psychotherapist has
reasonable cause to believe that the patient is in such a mental or
emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to the person or
property of another and that disclosure .. is necessary to prevent the
threatened danger.

CAL. EviD. CODE § 1024 (West 1966).
80. See note 17 and text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
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Commission's comment states that the purpose of section 1024 is to
enable a therapist to take appropriate action if disclosure is necessary to prevent threatened harm."' The preventive purpose of the
exception is emphasized by the two prerequisites to its applicability.
First, the therapist must have reasonable cause to believe the patient
is dangerous. Second, disclosure must be necessary to prevent
82
threatened danger.
In view of its prospective application, section 1024 would seem to
be of questionable utility to the Tarasoff plaintiff seeking discovery
after the harm has been done. The plaintiff may contend that the
defendant-therapist's claim of privilege is inapposite because he had
reasonable cause to believe his patient dangerous and disclosure was
necessary to prevent harm. The defendant-therapist could logically
counter that even if the plaintiff's contentions are true, disclosure at
this time is not necessary to prevent harm. By emphasizing the
preventive purpose of the exception and justifiably insisting on a
narrow technical construction of the statutory language,8 3 the defendant-therapist might argue that the exception was intended to
avert harm, not to authorize intrusions into the confidentiality of
psychotherapy for the purpose of a lawsuit. Precedent exists, however, for the retrospective application of section 1024.
In People v. Hopkins ,84 the defendant, after an assurance of confidentiality, told a therapist of his recent participation in certain violent crimes. The therapist subsequently sent the defendant, Hopkins,
alone in a taxi to another branch of the hospital. There Hopkins
repeated his story to two non-therapist nurses. They notified hospital
security personnel who in turn notified the police. This information
led to Hopkins' arrest and a confession which the defendant sought
to suppress at trial as a privileged therapist-patientcommunication. 85
The appellate court held that even if Hopkins' arrest had resulted
from a disclosure to the therapist, the trial court's denial of the
motion to suppress was proper. In retrospect the court determined
that Hopkins held no privilege:
81. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1024 comment (West 1966).

82. Id. § 1024.
83. See text accompanying note 74 supra.
84. 44 Cal. App. 3d 669, 119 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1975).
85. Id. at 673, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 63. The case as reported indicates that Hopkins
sought to suppress his confession subsequent to arrest on the ground that it was
a therapist-patient communication. It is difficult to see how he could do this,
unless his argument was premised on a "fruit of the 'privileged' tree" theory. His
confession to police clearly was not a therapist-patient communication. See
CAL. EviD. CODE § 1012 (West Supp. 1977).

'From the evidence the trial court reasonably concluded that the
psychotherapist had reasonable cause to believe that Hopkins was "in
such mental or emotional condition as to be dangerous to himself or to
the person or property of another and that disclosure of the communiUnder
cation [was] necessary to prevent the threatened danger."
the circumstances Hopkins held no privilege under the Evidence
Code .... 86

By changing the criterion for the applicability of section 1024 from
"disclosure . .. is necessary to prevent. . threatened danger" to
"disclosure was necessary," the Hopkins court altered the orientation of the dangerous-patient exception. The use of the exception in
Hopkins was not for the purpose of preventing harm; rather, it was
applied retrospectively to defeat a claim of privilege. Because the
therapist had reasonable cause to believe his patient dangerous, and
because disclosure was necessary to prevent harm, no privilege came
into being. That determination was made, not by the therapist, but
after the fact by the court. Apparently, the therapist's conclusion was
that the patient was not dangerous and that disclosure was unnecessary. He had permitted the patient to travel unescorted in a taxi, and
he had made no disclosure. It follows from the Hopkins rationale
that communications falling within the dangerous-patient exception
are not privileged and do not become privileged even when disclosure
is no longer necessary to prevent harm. More significantly, the court
may determine the applicability of the exception after the fact, even
in the face of a contrary determination by the therapist at the time.
Herein lies the utility of section 1024 to the Tarasoffplaintiff. If his
discovery attempts are met with a claim of privilege by the defendant-therapist, the plaintiff can urge that the dangerous-patient exception prevented any privilege from attaching and can request the
court to determine whether the privilege or the exception applies.
TE MEcHANIcs OF DECIDING THE PRIVILEGE ISSUE
The Section 405 Hearing
The resolution of a disputed claim of privilege is made according to
the provisions of California Evidence Code section 405.87 Section 405
86. 44 Cal. App. 3d at 674, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 64 (1975).
87. CAL. Evm. CODE § 914 (West 1966). See id. § 405 comment. The sequence of
events which will bring the disputed claim of privilege to a determination under
§ 405 is as follows: The plaintiff will attempt to make discovery under CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE §§ 2016, 2030, 2031, 2033 (West Supp. 1977). The defendant-therapist
will refuse the plaintiff's discovery on the ground that the matter sought is
within the therapist-patient privilege. The plaintiff will move under id. § 2034(a)
to compel the defendant to allow discovery. At the hearing held pursuant to the
provisions of § 2034(a), the privilege question will be decided, as required, according to the provisions of CAL. EvrD. CODE § 914(a) (West 1966), which stipulates that the procedure to be used in such a determination is id. § 405 (West
1966).
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requires that a party claiming a privilege has the burden of establishing its applicability. A party opposing a claim of privilege must show
the pertinence of an exception.8 8 Assuming the defendant-therapist
has evidenced preliminary facts showing the existence of the therapist-patient privilege, the Tarasoff plaintiff must persuade the trial
judge that the dangerous-patient exception is applicable.
Generally, the trial judge may not require disclosure of information claimed to be privileged in order to rule on the claim. 89 However,
when the applicability of the therapist-patient privilege depends on
the content of the therapist-patient communications, Lifschutz enables the trial judge to require that the contents be revealed to him. 9°
The trial judge must take precautions to protect the confidentiality of
the communications.9 In Tarasoff situations where the defendanttherapist has claimed the privilege and the plaintiff is attempting to
establish the exception, the privileged status of the communication
depends on its content. Thus, there is no obstacle to access by the
trial judge in order for him to rule.
At the inquiry conducted under section 405 into the applicability
of the dangerous-patient exception, the trial judge must decide 1) if
the therapist had reasonable cause to believe his patient dangerous,
and 2) if disclosure was necessary to prevent threatened harm. For
practical and policy reasons this two-step analysis should be accomplished in reverse order. The issues will be addressed here in that
order.
Disclosure to Prevent Threatened Harm
The foreseeability of injury to the plaintiff should be the threshhold question. If the plaintiff was not a foreseeable victim, disclosure
could not have been necessary to prevent harm even if the defendanttherapist had reasonable cause to predict dangerousness. The
foreseeability issue should be addressed first because it is the easier
question and because a negative answer will preclude further inquiry. 92 Trial judges have much experience, with the concept of
foreseeability. Furthermore, the question can usually be answered by
88. CAL. EVID. CODE § 405 comment (West 1966).

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. § 915(a).
2 Cal. 3d at 437 n.23, 467 P.2d at 571 n.23, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 843 n.23.
Id.
In order for the exception to apply, the therapist must have had rea-

sonable cause to predict dangerousness, and disclosure must have been necessary to prevent harm. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1024 (West 1966).

a relatively superficial examination of the putatively privileged communications. If no direct or indirect reference is made to the plaintiff
therein, and if no other indication of foreseeability appears, the
question will be answered negatively and further inquiry will be
unnecessary. The Lifschutz court has stated that "[n]ecessary information will often be accessible without delving deeply into specific
intimate factual circumstances and such searching probes ought to
be avoided whenever possible. ' 93 If the plaintiff may have been a
foreseeable victim and disclosure may have been necessary, the trial
judge must proceed to examine the reasonable cause requirement.
Reasonable Cause to Predict Dangerousness
The section 1024 exception will apply only if the therapist had
reasonable cause to predict dangerousness. This provision entails
some difficulty. If it can be avoided by dealing with the foreseeability
issue first, the section 405 hearing will be greatly simplified.
The reasonableness standard might be viewed as a base standard
below which the therapist may not fall without risk of liability. If a
reasonable person would have predicted violence it seems safe to say
that a psychotherapist should also have anticipated it. However, a
reasonable lay person might overreact to the patient's behavior. Conversely, there will be cases where a reasonable lay person would not
94
have predicted violence although a psychotherapist should have.
The danger exists that the trial judge, responding as a reasonable
"lay" person, will rule according to whether he would have predicted
violence, even though professional psychological standards might
require a different result. Perhaps the best solution to this problem is
an awareness of its existence. Careful attention to the statutory
language will prevent the trial judge's perspective from wandering.
The exception applies "if the psychotherapist has reasonable
cause."9 5 If the trial judge is in doubt whether the information contained in the therapist-patient communications should have given a
trained psychotherapist reasonable cause, the issue becomes whether
the inadequate expertise of a trial judge in the area of psychological
standards can be augmented by expert opinion at the section 405
proceeding.
The Availability of Expert Opinion at the Section 405 Proceeding
The ruling in Lifschutz that a trial judge may require disclosure of
93. 2 Cal. 3d at 438 n.25, 467 P.2d at 572 n.25, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 844 n.25.
94. But see Ennis & Litwak, Psychiatryand the Presumptionof Expertise:
Flipping Coins in the Courtroom,62 CALIF. L. Rav. 693,696,734 (1974), in which

it is asserted that psychotherapists are no more expert in predicting dangerousness than laymen and are in fact less accurate predictors.
95. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1024 (West 1966).
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putatively privileged communications in order to rule on a claim of

privilege when the privilege depends on the content of the communications is basically a recognition that a trial judge cannot do the
impossible. He cannot decide the privilege issue rationally while
blinded to the information essential to the decision. The trial judge's
circumstance in deciding a section 1024 reasonable cause issue is
much the same. The trial judge may be asked to make a borderline
decision in terms of professional psychological standards without
any prior training in psychology. In these cases the Lifschutz
rationale of permitting the trial judge the informational background
necessary to rule should be extrapolated to allow consultation with
expert opinion.
Lifschutz allows the trial judge access to information necessary to
pass on the privilege issue but admonishes the judge to protect the
confidentiality of the communication.9 6 Any disclosure beyond the
trial judge might seem at variance with this requirement. However,
Lifschutz refers to California Evidence Code section 915(b) as a
comparable and presumably acceptable procedure for protecting the
97
confidentiality of therapist-patient communications.
Section 915(b) provides that the court may require disclosure "in
chambers out of the presence and hearing of all persons except the
person authorized to claim the privilege and such other persons as
the person authorized to claim the privilege is willing to have present."9 8 The implication is that not only may the trial judge require
that the contents be revealed to him, but also, if the defendanttherapist is willing, the trial judge may call on expert opinion to
99
assist him in his determination.
The inquiry at the section 405 hearing as to whether the therapist
had reasonable cause to predict dangerousness can be dealt with
adequately by a judge with the advice of one or more experts. A
preliminary screening of Tarasoff complaints by such a panel would
96. 2 Cal. 3d at 437 n.23, 467 P.2d at 571 n.23, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 843 n.23.

97. Id.
98. CAL. EVID. CODE § 915(b) (West 1966) (emphasis added).

99. Section 915(b) requires that the therapist must agree to having others
present at the determination of the privilege. If the defendant-therapist refuses
to allow the trial judge to consult with experts at the § 405 hearing it is debatable
whether this refusal can result in an inference against him. Id. § 913(a) prohibits
any presumption or inference from arising because of an "exercise of
privilege"; i.e., "a privilege ... exercised not to testify with respect to any
matter, or to refuse to disclose any matter." At the § 405 inquiry into the existence of the privilege, however, where the contents of the therapist-patient com-

seem to be acceptable to the psychological professions as well as to
the individual defendant-therapists. According to the provisions of
section 915(b), the defendant-therapist may be present at the section
405 hearing. In his presentation of the therapist-patient communications, the therapist's arguments can be heard exparte in explanation
and justification of his course of treatment. The arguments can be
analyzed by the court with the assistance of the consulting experts,
and a decision can be rendered on an informed basis in view of all the
circumstances.
Section 1024 and the Tarasoff Cause of Action
The elements of the dangerous-patient exception are basically the
same as the essential elements of the Tarasoff cause of action.'
Thus, the inquiry into whether the privilege or the exception will
prevail is also a preliminary inquiry into the merits of the plaintiff's
case. This feature of the exception enhances its appropriateness for
eliminating unfounded allegations. Section 405, under which the
privilege inquiry will be conducted, provides for situations in which
"a preliminary fact is also a fact in issue in the action." Section 405
states that in such cases "[t]he jury shall not be informed of the
court's determination as to the existence or non-existence of the
preliminary fact."'' If the privilege is held to prevail and discovery
of the therapist-patient communication is denied, the plaintiff may
pursue his action without prejudice. On the other hand, if the exception is held applicable and discovery granted, the defendant-theramunication can be required to be disclosed, it would seem that there could be no
"exercise of the privilege." The therapist cannot refuse to testify, nor can he
refuse to disclose any matter.
The comment to § 913(a), in explaining the purpose of the section, states that if
adverse inferences could be drawn from an exercise of privilege "a litigant
would be under great pressure to 'forgo his claim of privilege and the protection
sought to be afforded by the privilege would be largely negated." This rationale
is inapposite at the § 405 hearing where the confidentiality of the communication
is required to be protected in any case. The protection of the privilege will not be
negated because one of the purposes of the § 405 inquiry is to preserve this
protection against unfounded complaints. Moreover, the comment goes on to
say that "inferences which might be drawn would, in many instances, be unwarranted." The likelihood of unwarranted negative inferences being drawn from a
defendant-therapist's refusal to permit the trial judge to have expert advice is
greatly reduced at the § 405 hearing. Because the confidentiality of the communication is assured, an obstructionist motive on the part of the therapist is
more likely than a concern for confidentiality. Practically speaking, it would
seem difficult to avoid negative inferences from even a suspicion of such a tactic
by a defendant-therapist. If, in fact, a negative inference is drawn and the
communications are held not privileged as a result, the therapist is without
recourse. Only the holder of the privilege, and not the therapist, can appeal a
supposed error in denying a claim of privilege. Id. § 918.
100. See note 17 supra.
101. CAL.EVD. CODE § 405 (West 1966).
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pist will not be prejudiced by a finding of preliminary fact essentially
the same as that which the plaintiff will attempt to prove at trial. In
effect, the dangerous-patient exception provides a judicial filter
through which Tarasoff complaints must pass before discovery is
allowed of therapist-patient communications.
CONCLUSION

The dangerous-patient exception provides the appropriate vehicle
for discovery in suits brought under the Tarasoff holding. Although
waiver and the patient-litigant exception may be useful to the
Tarasoff plaintiff, their applicability is uncertbin in many cases. The
breach of duty exception, despite an apparent expediency, is almost
surely inappropriate.

Under the section 1024 dangerous-patient exception a procedure
can be devised that will be fair to all parties. The plaintiff cannot be
prevented from discovering probative information by an arbitrary
claim of privilege; yet he is not given unbridled access to therapistpatient communications. The plaintiff will have the opportunity to
have the therapist-patient communications reviewed by a judge to
determine if the plaintiff may have been a foreseeable victim of the
patient's violent tendencies. If foreseeability is found, the communication can be reviewed by the court advised by experts to determine
if there is any evidence of a negligent failure to predict dangerousness. The defendant-therapist will be able to claim the privilege and
in good faith object to the plaintiff's discovery. Perhaps even more
important from the therapist's standpoint, he will be heard at the
section 405 hearing where the privilege issue is decided. As a result of
this inquiry, the communications will be held either privileged or
within the exception, and discovery will be granted accordingly.
Section 1024 seems to work effectively and reliably to the advantage
of all legitimate interests. Section 1024 can balance the plaintiff's
interest in access to probative information against the defendant's
interest in maintaining therapist-patient confidentiality. By interposing informed judicial consideration of the necessity for disclosure
between the allegation of negligence and the grant of discovery, the
dangerous-patient exception can preclude unwarranted intrusions
into therapist-patient confidentiality as well as prevent obstructive
claims of privilege.
ALEXANDER J. OLANDER
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